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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Hey, hey, what do you say? We demand fair pay.”1 More than 200 fast food 
restaurant employees chanted this statement on November 29, 2012 in New York 
City in an attempt to raise awareness of their inability to live above the poverty 
line with their current wages.2 The demonstration marked the beginning of a 
nationwide campaign to raise wages and obtain union rights for employees of 
franchises such as McDonald’s and Burger King.3 Employees of McDonald’s 
franchisees made the company the center of current litigation, however, as 
employees alleged multiple instances of unfair labor practices against 
McDonald’s in contravention of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).4 Case 
precedent shows that only franchisees, as opposed to franchisors, could be 
responsible for unfair labor practices in any franchise agreement, as they exercise 
immediate control over their employees.5 Such claims of franchisee control 
originally made the employees’ cases against McDonald’s as a franchise appear 
weak.6 However, on July 29, 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
 
1. Steven Greenhouse, With Day of Protests, Fast Food Workers Seek More Pay, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 29, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/nyregion/fast-food-workers-in-new-york-city-rally-for-higher-wage 
s.html?_r=0 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).  
2. Id.  
3. Jay-Anne Casuga, NLRB General Counsel Issues 13 Complaints Alleging McDonald’s Jointly Liable 
for ULPs, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 2, 2015), http://0-laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com.gocat.law.pacific.edu/ 
lerc/2445/split_display.adp?fedfid=60620598&vname=lecbnnews&wsn=499758500&searchid=24191921&doc
typeid=5&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=2445&pg=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
4. See MCDONALD’S FACT SHEET, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-
outreach/ fact-sheets/mcdonalds-fact-sheet (last visited Dec. 27, 2014) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (showing multiple complaints issued against McDonald’s for violations of the NLRA). 
5. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, Browning-Ferris Indus. (N.L.R.B. 2014) (Case No. 32-RC-
109684) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of General Counsel] (stating that under the current joint employer definition, 
franchisors are not held liable for labor violations of their franchisees employees). 
6. See Allen Smith, NLRB General Counsel: McDonald’s is Joint Employer with Franchisees, SOC’Y FOR 
HUMAN RES. MGMT. (July 30, 2014), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/pages/nlrb-joint-
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ruled that for the purpose of the employees’ cases, McDonald’s should be 
considered a joint employer with its franchisees.7 The decision brought about 
much controversy, especially in light of the fact that the NLRB did not give any 
legal justification8 for its decision to make McDonald’s a joint employer.9  
The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) assisted in the execution 
of these protests and believes the NLRB decision to find McDonald’s as a joint 
employer in cases associated with the protests will make it easier to unionize 
employees of franchisees.10 It is possible for workers to unionize within their 
franchise against the respective franchise owners (the franchisee), but generally, 
this is not as effective for multiple reasons: (1) the strategies the SEIU uses are 
not as effective with small business owners; (2) with over 3,000 independently 
owned franchises, the cost of organizing each individual unit generally outweighs 
the benefits—there are over 3,000 independently owned franchises, generally 
making the cost of organizing each individual unit outweigh the benefits; and (3) 
because McDonald’s exerts so much control over its franchisees, company 
protocol constrains management at local franchises and leaves them without 
discretion to change their employees’ wages and benefits.11 The SEIU stated that 
a broader definition of “joint employer” will make it easier to organize 
employees of franchises into unions.12 The Board’s recent holding in Browning-
 
employers.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (The ruling by the NLRB’s Division of 
Advice asserting that McDonald’s Corp. is a ‘joint employer’ of its franchisees’ employees overturns 30 years 
of established law regarding the franchise model in the United States.”). 
7. Office of Public Affairs, NLRB Office of the General Counsel Authorizes Complaints against 
McDonald’s Franchisees and Determines McDonald’s, USA, LLC is a Joint Employer, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD. 
(Jul. 29, 2014), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-
authorizes-complaints-against-mcdonalds [hereinafter NLRB General Counsel Authorizes Complaints] (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
8. However, a recent opinion, Browning-Ferris Industries, __N.L.R.B.__, Case 32-RC-109684 (2015), 
held that it would be overruling the stricter definition of “joint employer” and implements a “joint employer” 
standard that is easier to fulfill. The decision outlines reasons for the return to a broader interpretation of “joint 
employer” and is discussed in Part IV.C of this Comment. Browning-Ferris came out approximately one year 
after the Board announced that it would hold McDonald’s as a “joint employer” for the purposes of these 
decisions.  
9. Jeffrey Dorfman, McDonald’s Ruling by NLRB Counsel Puts SEIU’s Unionization Goal within Reach, 
FORBES (July 30, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2014/07/30/mcdonalds-
ruling-by-nlrb-counsel-puts-seius-unionization-goal-within-reach/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review); see NLRB General Counsel Authorizes Complaints, supra note 7 (stating that the NLRB will 
consider McDonald’s a joint employer). 
10. Id. 
11. Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15; See James Sherk, Unions for Big 
Businesses, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 4, 2014), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/384453/unions-big-
businesses-james-sherk (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining franchisees handle 
all hiring and employment). 
12. See Ben Penn, To Unions, McDonald’s Joint Employer Status No Slam Dunk, as Fast Food Push 
Intensifies, DAILY LAB. REP. (Sept. 18, 2014), available at http://www.bna.com/unions-mcdonalds-joint-
n17179895030/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating “[a] more liberal NLRB joint 
employer definition could put franchisors in the situation of having to bargain on behalf of franchisees,” which 
the current standard does not require). 
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Ferris, which signaled the return of a broader joint employer standard, only 
reaffirmed the SEIU’s hopes for unionization efforts.13 
However, the SEIU’s optimism is not well-founded. The joint employer 
analysis calls for a case-by-case examination14 of the franchisor-franchisee 
relationship.15 Because the definition of joint employer requires a case-by-case 
analysis of relevant facts, unions such as those the SEIU created will have to 
independently establish a joint employer relationship with each franchise before 
they can unionize all employees working for McDonald’s.16 Although 
McDonald’s has uniform standardized contracts with its franchisees, case 
precedent does not make it easy for other franchisees to establish a joint 
employer relationship with their franchisors.17 Unionizing employees will still 
have the burden of showing that there are no franchise-to-franchise distinctions 
large enough to warrant an individual review of the relationships between 
particular franchisees and McDonald’s.18 McDonald’s has a substantial interest in 
preventing case precedent that establishes a joint employer relationship with a 
franchisee, and will work hard to prevent courts from recognizing that 
relationship.19 The court’s declaration of a joint employer relationship is 
important to unions because McDonald’s is only legally bound by the provisions 
of the NLRA if they it is a joint employer with its franchisees.20 Therefore, under 
any case-by-case analysis standard, the SEIU will not be able to effectively 
unionize McDonald’s franchisee’s employees; instead, courts should incorporate 
a new doctrine in which they perform a franchise-by-franchise analysis:21 once a 
franchisor is determined to be a joint employer with any one of its franchisees, a 
joint employer relationship is established between the franchisor and all of its 
franchisees.  
 
13. Noam Scheiber & Stephanie Strom, Labor Board Ruling Eases Way for Fast-Food Union’s Efforts, 
N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/business/labor-board-says-
franchise-workers-can-bargain-with-parent-company.html?_r=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review).  
14. See Browning-Ferris Industries, __ N.L.R.B. __, Case 32-RC-109684, 1, 18–20 (stating that each 
case presents “material issues”). 
15. Infra Part IV.C. 
16. Infra Part IV.C. 
17. Infra Part IV.C. 
18. See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984) (requiring the moving party to establish a joint employer 
relationship). 
19. See Melanie Trottman & Julie Jargon, NLRB Names McDonald’s as ‘Joint-Employer’ at Its 
Franchisees, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrb-names-mcdonalds-as-
joint-employer-of-workers-at-its-franchisees-1419018664 (stating that McDonald’s plans to contest the joint 
employer allegations against them as they are improperly placed). 
20. See Raymond G. McGuire, The Labor Law Aspects of Franchising, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 
215, 239 (1972) (“Whether the franchisor will be characterized as an employer of the interest group which the 
union seeks to represent.”). 
21. See infra Part V. 
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This Comment will establish the necessity of a franchise-by-franchise 
doctrine by first analyzing the NLRA. Part II discusses the policy goals of the 
NLRA, both in its initial enactment and with the Taft-Hartley amendment.22 Part 
III will explain the current business-format model of the franchise, whether 
employees of franchisees were a likely class of persons the NLRA meant to 
protect, and why the current business-format model does not allow employees to 
receive their established rights under the NLRA.23 Part IV will develop the 
history of the term “joint employer” and conclude that despite a broader 
interpretation of the joint employer standard, the implementation of the current 
joint employer doctrine still does not adequately protect collective bargaining 
rights of employees of franchisees.24 Part V will examine proposals sent to the 
Board by the General Counsel suggesting a return to the broader definition of 
joint employer developed in the 1950s.25 This Comment will then conclude that 
the only way employees of franchisees’ rights under the NLRA can be fully 
realized is through the courts’ application of a franchise-by-franchise analysis.26 
II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
Congress enacted the NLRA―also known as the Wagner Act―in part to 
decrease the number of strikes27 that were obstructing interstate commerce.28 
Congress believed that meaningful collective bargaining for employees would 
scale back the strikes—the larger an employee’s voice in employment 
negotiations, the less reason they had to strike.29 However, in 1947, the Taft-
Hartley Act amended the NLRA and imposed restrictions on union practices, 
causing courts and the NLRB to question whether unions promoted or obstructed 
interstate commerce.30 An in-depth analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that 
the amendments do not change the original policy of the NLRA, and that 
meaningful collective bargaining is still an essential employee right.31 
 
22.  Infra Part II.  
23.  Infra Part III. 
24.  Infra Part IV.  
25.  Id.  
26.  Infra Part V.  
27. The strikes were mainly to gain recognition of labor unions, which in turn would help end the 
deplorable working conditions during that time (low wages and long hours). Florence Peterson, Review of 
Strikes in the United States, 46 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1047, 1059–60 (1938). 
28. See infra Part II.B. 
29. See infra Part II.B. 
30. See infra Part II.C.1. 
31. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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A. A Brief Overview of the NLRA  
“Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 to protect the 
rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to 
curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the 
general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”32 Proponents of 
the NLRA envisioned that the Act would give employees means to collectively 
bargain with employers and create a system of self-governance.33 
1. The Board and General Counsel 
The NLRA established the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) to 
help enforce the NLRA.34 The President appoints five members to the Board, and 
the Senate approves the President’s selections.35 The Board has the power to 
examine issues employees present alleging unfair labor practices.36 After a 
hearing, if the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the 
employer violated fair labor practices, it can issue an order requiring desistance 
of the behavior.37 Non-compliance with board decisions triggers a review by the 
United States District Court or direct review by the United States Court of 
Appeals.38 
 
32. National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-
relations-act (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) [hereinafter National Labor Relations Act] (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
33. See Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 199, 218 (1960) (explaining that the NLRA meant more to Wagner than simply negating industrial strife). 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2014). 
35. Id.  
36. Id. at § 160 (unfair labor practices include any violation listed in § 158); see also id. at § 158 (listing 
unfair labor practices such as: interfering with employees right to self-organization, join unions, or bargain 
collectively through representatives; interfering with the formation or administration of labor organizations; 
hiring employees on the basis of whether they are or are not in a union . . . etc.). 
37. Id. at § 160. 
38. The case can be brought “in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor 
practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transactions 
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” Id.  
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2. Rights of Employees and Employers and Unfair Labor Practices 
The NLRA establishes the rights of employees39 as follows: 
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted actives for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,40 and 
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities 
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement 
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment as authorized [in section 158 of this title].41 
The NLRA then lists five employer actions42 that are considered unfair labor 
practices under the Act: (1) interfering with the employee’s granted rights, as 
stated above; (2) interfering with “formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribut[ing] financial or other support to it;” (3) “discrimination 
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
 
39. The NLRA defines “employee” as: 
[A]ny employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the 
Act . . . explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a 
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor 
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, 
but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic 
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, 
or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a 
supervisor, or any individual employed by an en employer subject to the Railway Labor Act . . . 
or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined. 
Id. at § 152. It is important to note that the Taft-Hartley Act restricted the definition of employee by adding “or 
any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor” to 
those groups explicitly excluded from the definition of employer. Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1947). Others argue that courts had already dissociated 
these categories of employees from protection under the NLRA. Robert J. Rosenthal, Exclusions of Employees 
under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 556, 559, 565 (1951). 
40. Under the Wagner Act, the text preceding this footnote represented the complete section of the Rights 
of Employees; the Taft-Hartley Act amended this section by adding the right to refrain from activities. 1947 
Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., available at http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/ 
national-labor-relations-act (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions] (on 
file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
41. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2014). 
42. An employer is defined in the NLRA as “any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or 
indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal 
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act.” Id. 
at § 152. This comment analyzes the meaning of employer, more specifically of joint employer, in Part III, 
infra. 
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organization;”43 (4) “to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee 
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act;” and (5) 
“refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.”44 
The NLRA also restricts “unfair labor practices by labor organization[s].”45 
There are seven practices that union organizations cannot engage in: (1) 
compelling employees to exercise rights guaranteed by the NLRA; (2) trying to 
make an employer discriminate against an employee because they are not part of 
a union; (3) “refus[ing] to bargain collectively with an employer;” (4) 
participating in or encouraging strikes; (5) requiring excessive payments by 
employees; (6) coercing employers to pay for services not received; and (7) 
negotiations must be with certified representatives when employees threaten to 
strike based on disregard of the representative by the employer.46 
B. The National Industrial Recovery Act: The NLRA’s Predecessor 
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was enacted before the NLRA, 
and Senator Wagner intended the NLRA to be modeled after the NIRA.47 The 
NIRA’s failures shaped the stated purpose of the NLRA.48 
During the Great Depression, supporters of the New Deal undertook various 
means to help boost the economy.49 Congress enacted the NLRA only after the 
Supreme Court found its predecessor, the NIRA, unconstitutional.50 Although 
both the NIRA and the NLRA encourage union organizing, the Acts had different 
stated purposes.51 Congress enacted the NIRA with the purpose of harmonizing a 
balance of production and consumption.52 Proponents of the NIRA believed 
economic problems arose because workers who produced goods did not have 
enough money to purchase them.53 This resulted in a market imbalance: a high 
 
43. The Act makes various exceptions that allow employers to make agreements with unions under 
certain conditions. Id. at § 158. 
44. Id.  
45. It is important to note that these violations were not part of the original Wagner Act, but were added 
by the Taft Hartley Act. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40. This is discussed in more 
detail in Part II.C of this comment.   
46. 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
47. See E.G. Latham, Legislative Purpose and Administrative Policy under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 433, 434–39 (1936) (discussing the history of legislation that led to the enactment of 
the NLRA). 
48. Id.  
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 541–42, 549. 
51. Id. at 443. 
52. LEVERETT S. LYON, ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: AN ANALYSIS AND 
APPRAISAL 5 (1935). 
53. Id. at 6. 
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number of goods available for purchase, but few consumers capable of 
purchasing the goods.54 
Part of the NIRA was aimed at stabilizing this imbalance by giving workers 
broader collective bargaining rights, thereby giving them higher salaries and 
greater purchasing power.55 However, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. 
United States found the NIRA unconstitutional because it granted legislative 
powers to the executive branch and extended federal power beyond that granted 
to Congress under the Commerce Clause.56 The Supreme Court found the link 
between interstate commerce and the NIRA too attenuated and therefore outside 
the power of the Commerce Clause, making the NIRA unconstitutional.57 
Congress enacted the NIRA with an expiration date and it contained many 
deficiencies58 that prompted Senator Wagner to propose similar legislation—the 
NLRA.59 Senator Wagner completed the legislation and presented it to Congress 
before the Schechter decision.60 Wagner originally stated two purposes of the 
NLRA. The first and main purpose mirrored the NIRA: to keep balance in 
workers’ wages and the amount of goods produced.61 The second purpose was to 
limit strikes that obstructed interstate commerce.62 However, in light of the 
Schechter decision and the NIRA’s unconstitutionality, Congress shifted the 
primary focus of the NLRA to the second reason in order to demonstrate a more 
direct effect on interstate commerce and ensure the NLRA’s constitutionality.63 In 
1937, the Supreme Court declared the NLRA constitutional in N.L.R.B. v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp.64 
C. How the NIRA’s Policy Affected the Purpose of the NLRA 
Despite Congress stating the primary purpose of the NLRA was to prevent 
strikes, Wagner often said the purpose of the NLRA is “to make the worker a free 
man.”
65
 The NLRA enabled workers to live in an industrial democracy, bargain 
for rights, and establish alternatives other than compliance with decisions of the 
 
54. Id.  
55. See Latham, supra note 47, at 441 (explaining section 7(a) of the NLRA). 
56. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42, 549 (1935). 
57. Id.  
58. See Theda Skocpol et al., Explaining New Deal Labor Policy, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1297, 1301 
(1990) (stating that NIRA policies were difficult to enforce). 
59. Id.  
60. Latham, supra note 47, at 440. 
61. Id. at 442–43. 
62. Id.  
63. Id. at 443. 
64. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30–31(1937). 
65. Keyserling, supra note 33, at 215. 
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industrialist bourgeoisie.66 However, according to Leon Keyserling, Senator 
Wagner’s legislative assistant, “[Wagner] never valued the [NLRA] primarily as 
a mere weapon for negating industrial strife, but rather as an affirmative vehicle 
for the economic and related social progress to which his life-long efforts were 
devoted.”67 This purpose aligns with that of the NIRA, and, despite the 
shortcomings that caused Congress to shift its primary purposes for enacting the 
NLRA, Wagner still believed in the original purpose of the NIRA and attributed 
its failures to faulty administration.68 
Wagner and other NLRA drafters who had worked on the NIRA took many 
ideas that were not successfully executed under that legislation and inserted them 
into the NLRA.69 The NLRA provided procedures for the Board to successfully 
enforce its decisions.70 This demonstrates that Wagner’s focus while securing the 
enactment of the NLRA centered on crafting a long-term solution to regulate 
interstate commerce by giving workers a voice in employment negotiations.71 
Empowering workers decreases the necessity for strikes that interrupt the flow of 
business. 72 Further by giving workers a voice in negotiations, their economic 
leverage is heightened, which helps balance consumer purchasing power with the 
amount of goods available on the market.73 The remedy in section 10(a) of the 
NLRA furthers Wagner’s view by empowering the Board “to prevent any person 
from engaging in any unfair labor practice [listed in the NLRA] affecting 
commerce.”
74
 
Therefore, it appears that the purpose of the NLRA is a combination of two 
goals. The first is to develop a self-governing industry, one where workers are 
not forced to work in an economy with employers fixing wages and benefits 
without representation of their employees’ needs.75 The second is to stabilize 
interstate commerce through means of ensuring communicative measures other 
 
66. See Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
223, 229–30 (2005) (“NLRA policies set out steps to make workplaces more democratic and to empower 
workers by giving them the skills to be citizens of a democracy”). 
67. Keyserling, supra note 33, at 218. 
68. Id. at 219. 
69. See Skocpol, et al., supra note 58, at 1301 (stating that many legislators who worked on the NIRA 
also helped draft the NLRA, imposing many of the same ideals in both). 
70. See id. (stating that NIRA policies were difficult to enforce). 
71. See Keyserling, supra note 33, at 220–21 (stating that Wagner “foresaw that this process within our 
enterprise system could become an integral part of a . . . larger cooperative process guided by intelligence which 
would animate the whole economy). 
72. See Cox, supra note 39, at 2–3 (“Employer interference with employee organization and denials of 
recognition were prime causes of industrial disputes.”). 
73. See Keyserling, supra note 33, at 218–19 (quoting Senator Wagner stating “[a]s profits rose faster 
than wages, the excess earnings were invested in more factories, turning out an ever-increasing volume of 
goods”). 
74. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2014). 
75. Supra Part II.A. 
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than strikes, and preserve harmony in the economy by keeping employee wages 
high enough to allow employees to purchase goods.76 
D. The Taft-Hartley Amendment and its Effect on the NLRA 
In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA by passing the Taft-Hartley Act.77 The 
Taft-Hartley Act has created confusion regarding the purpose of the NLRA78 
because Congress enacted it with the intent of narrowing union organizations’ 
power.79 There are two major changes the Taft-Hartley Act made to the Wagner 
Act: first, the declaration of purpose, and second, the addition of unfair labor 
practices by labor organizations.80 
1. Change in Declaration and Findings Clause 
The Taft-Hartley Act did not change the original Wagner Act declaration 
stressing the importance of collective bargaining;81 however, it did add additional 
findings that “certain practices by some labor organizations . . . have the intent or 
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free 
flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial 
unrest.”82 The amendment further stated that “[t]he elimination of such practices 
is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.”83 
Courts’ confusion in interpreting the purpose of the NLRA stems from this 
addition to the findings clause.84 Although the Taft-Hartley Act kept the findings 
of the importance of collective bargaining to prevent barriers to the stream of 
 
76. Supra Part II.A. 
77. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40. 
78. See James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law 
Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7, 12–13 (1985) (describing the new purpose clause in the NLRA 
resulting from the Taft-Hartley amendment, and noting that “[a]s a consequence of all of this, the Taft-Hartley 
Act contains conflicting statements of purpose that open the national labor law to conflicting interpretations of 
congressional intent”). 
79. Id. at 11. 
80. Infra Part II.C.1–2. It is important to note that the Taft-Harley Act brought other changes to the 
NLRA; however, they are not relevant to the discussion within this Comment. 
81. The Wagner Act declaration stated in part: 
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when 
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by 
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2014). 
82. Id.  
83. Id.  
84. See Gross, supra note 78, at 13 (discussing how the different meanings of the purposes clauses in the 
Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act have led to conflicting interpretations of the NLRA). 
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commerce, it appears to simultaneously discredit these findings by stating that 
labor organizations contribute to these obstructions.85 This resulted in two 
interpretations of the NLRA’s purpose: (1) to use unions as a means to encourage 
collective bargaining, and (2) to discourage the use of unions because they 
obstruct the stream of commerce.86 
2. Addition of Unfair Labor Practices by Labor Organizations 
The Taft-Hartley Act also extended potential liability to labor organizations 
for engaging in unfair labor practices.87 Originally, the NLRA only contemplated 
unfair labor practices by employers.88 The amendment made employers and 
unions equal under the NLRA.89 Commentators believe the Wagner Act had not 
contemplated unfair labor practices by labor organizations because at the time, 
they had no power to implement them.90 However, because Congress enacted the 
NLRA with the purpose of empowering unions, it seems likely that Congress 
considered the implications of the unions’ potential new-found power.91 Congress 
did in fact contemplate curtailing the power of unions, but “rejected this view . . . 
on the ground that since labor organizations exist for the purpose of organizing 
employees, while employers should not be concerned with questions of 
organization.” 92 
Ultimately, the Taft-Hartley Act placed the process of collective bargaining 
under Board regulation.93 Its enactment reflected the shift in view from a belief 
that unions help the “free flow of commerce,” to the view that unions inhibit 
commerce and that their power needs to be restricted.94 However, the NLRA as it 
stands today still states the original purpose of the Wagner Act—thus, courts 
should interpret the NLRA consistent with Congress’ intent.95 Courts should 
interpret the addition as simply stating that some labor organization practices 
may have the effect of obstructing commerce, resulting in Congress placing 
 
85. 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
86. See Gross, supra note 78, at 13. 
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
88. Jerome S. Wohlmuth & Rhoda P. Krupka, The Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining, 9 MD. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1948). 
89. Guy Farmer, The NLRB: Its Past, Present and Future, 23 TENN. L. REV. 112, 113–14 (1954). 
90. Id.  
91. See Cox, supra note 39, at 24–25 (“[W]hen the Wagner bill was before Congress, it was argued that 
labor organizations should be prohibited to the same extent as employers from interfering with, coercing, and 
restraining employees in the exercise of their rights.”). 
92. Id.  
93. Wohlmuth & Krupka, supra note 88, at 2. 
94. Supra Part II.C.1. 
95. Dannin, supra note 66, at 262–63. 
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limitations on labor practices by labor organizations.96 This finding can coexist 
with Senator Wagner’s policy goals, as Congress’ preservation of the original 
purpose clause in the NLRA demonstrates.97 
The Taft-Hartley Act changed courts’ interpretation of the NLRA,98 but the 
conservation of the original purpose clause demonstrates that meaningful 
collective bargaining is still an important policy behind the NLRA.99 Taft-
Hartley’s NLRA purpose clause addition does not undermine the importance of 
collective bargaining and its necessity to keep the economy balanced.100 The 
NLRA’s purpose is to promote meaningful collective bargaining between 
employees and employers; this finding justifies the importance of empowering 
employees of franchisees with collective bargaining power.101 
III. THE BUSINESS-FORMAT MODEL AND WHY IT SHOULD BE REGULATED 
UNDER THE NLRA 
Two predominant franchise business models exist: (1) the traditional 
franchise and (2) the business-format franchise.102 Generally, the traditional 
franchise involves sale of a final good from franchisors to franchisees.103 
Franchisors with a business-format franchise model offer an entire business-
format to their franchisees.104 Therefore, the two differ in how much guidance the 
franchisee gets from the franchisor when it purchases a franchise.105 Because of 
the larger amount of guidance in the business-format franchise, franchisors 
directly and indirectly make employment decisions regarding the employees of 
the franchisees.106 Thus, franchisors make these decisions without any legal 
 
96. See id. at 262 (stating that the Taft-Hartley Act should be read as “exist[ing] within the framework of 
the NLRA rights”). 
97. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40. 
98. See Cox, supra note 39, at 45 (stating that “[t]he greatest danger in the amendments, however, lies 
less in the actual changes in the statute than in the philosophy on which they are based”). 
99. See 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40 (demonstrating that the original findings 
clause is still intact). 
100. See Dannin, supra note 66, at 262–63 (noting that the Taft-Hartley amendment should not be read as 
undermining the original policy goals of the NLRA). 
101. See infra Part III.B. 
102. Francine Lafontaine & Roger D. Blair, Article: The Evolution of Franchising and Franchise 
Contracts: Evidence from the United States, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 381, 383–84 (2009). 
103. Id. at 385. 
104. Byron E. Fox & Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation—Solutions in Search of Problems?, 20 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 241, 249 (1995). 
105. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 385 (2009) (describing a traditional franchise). But see 
Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 249 (1995) (describing a business-format franchise). 
106. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15 (stating that franchises presently 
exercise more control over franchisees, such that they are a necessary party to meaningful collective 
bargaining). 
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responsibility for labor violations under the current joint employer doctrine.107 
Because franchisors are not considered employers of the franchisees’ employees, 
the franchisee employees do not have a chance to discuss the parameters of their 
employment with the franchisors the parties that truly control the labor 
decisions.108 Consequently, the franchisee employees are left without the ability 
to engage in meaningful collective bargaining that the NLRA guarantees to 
them.109 This is why the design of business-format franchises warrants the judicial 
declaration such franchisors’ statuses as joint employer. 
A. The Business-Format Franchise 
In the business-format franchise, “a franchisor, instead of merely licensing 
the right to distribute and sell a branded product, offers a complete ‘business-
format’ to its franchisees for a substantial fee, with the franchisees bearing most 
of the business development costs.”110 The distinction between the traditional 
franchise and the business-format franchise is that franchisors of a traditional 
franchise simply offer a trademarked product, whereas business-format 
franchisors offer a product as well as the marketing and business scheme.111 The 
business-format is advantageous to franchisees because it lowers the costs of 
entering the market.112 Those who want to enter a franchise deal know that the 
public is familiar with the product or service they are going to offer.113 The 
business-format franchise is also advantageous to franchisors because the 
franchisees are familiar with the local economy, which makes it more likely that 
the franchises will be profitable.114 For example, McDonald’s affords people the 
opportunity to enter the market with a product and service that has been 
successful with the public.115 McDonald’s, the franchisor, also benefits from the 
 
107. See id. (noting that under the current joint employer definition, franchisors are not held liable for 
labor violations of their franchisees employees). 
108. See Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., Keynote Address at West Virginia 
University College of Law’s Labor Law Conference: Zealous Advocacy for Social Change (Oct. 24, 2014), 
available at http://wvulaw.mediasite.com/Mediasite/Play/31e143f0990647558b0268e9086ca3e4 [hereinafter 
Keynote Address at WVU] (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review) (stating that McDonald’s 
employees are sent home as a result of a decision made by franchisors). 
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2014) (stating the findings clause of the NLRA and its purpose to promote 
meaningful collective bargaining). 
110. Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 249. 
111. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 385 (describing a traditional franchise). But see Fox & 
Su, supra note 104, at 249 (describing a business-format franchise). 
112. Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 252. 
113. Id. at 252 (“The business-format generally results in lower risks of small business failure because the 
franchisee establishes and operates his business in strict conformance with the format”). 
114. Id. at 251. 
115. See id. at 252 (stating generally how business format franchises work and that McDonald’s is an 
example of one). 
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franchisee’s localized knowledge of the market.116 This guaranteed profitability 
allows the franchise to expand rapidly.117 The business-format model offers 
potential for large profits to both parties, which explains its growing popularity.118 
B. The Business-Format Franchise and the NLRA 
Though the concept for the business-format model developed in the 1890s, it 
did not become popular until the 1950sCfifteen years after Congress enacted the 
NLRA.119 This begs the question of whether Congress would have intended the 
NLRA to cover modern business-format franchisors as employers had they 
existed in 1935. 
Congress enacted the NLRA to provide workers with a way to collectively 
bargain with employers.120 Wagner wanted the Act to adapt as the marketplace 
changed.121 Even though labor problems today are not identical to those in the 
1930s, the continuous strikes over the last two years by fast food workers 
demonstrate worker dissatisfaction resembling the industrial strife in existence 
when Congress enacted the NLRA: both stemming from a lack of worker 
recognition.122 Therefore, it seems likely that Congress intended the NLRA to 
encompass the modern franchise because employees of franchisees should be 
enabled to collectively bargain with franchisors. 
C. The Business-Format Franchise and the NLRA after the Taft-Hartley Act 
Although courts began interpreting the NLRA as if the Taft-Hartley Act 
weakened the importance of collective bargaining, the amendment left the 
statement of the importance of collective bargaining in the NLRA.123 The Taft-
Hartley Act added that some labor organization practices negatively impact 
interstate commerce.124 However, Congress knew and contemplated the fact that 
strikes obstruct interstate commerce.125 In fact, NLRA legislators recognized 
collective bargaining as a solution to strikes.126 Studies had shown that strikes 
 
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 251. 
118. See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 102, at 386 (stating that the business-format franchise became 
popular in the US and Canada, and eventually all over the world). 
119. Id. at 385–86. See also National Labor Relations Act, supra note 32. 
120. Supra Part II. 
121. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
122. See Cox, supra note 39, at 2 (noting that strikes resulted from a lack of collective bargaining and 
non-recognition by employers). 
123. Gross, supra note 78, at 11. 
124. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40. 
125. Cox, supra note 39, at 3. 
126. See id. (stating that Congress had recognized through a study in 1894 that “interference with 
employee organization and denials of recognition were prime causes of industrial disputes”). 
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resulted from workers frustrated by their lack of recognition from employers.127 
This is why NLRA legislators encouraged collective bargaining as a means to 
increase employers’ worker recognition and, in turn, to reduce strikes.128 Under 
this interpretation, the Taft-Hartley Act aligns perfectly with the original intent of 
the NRLA and the importance of collective bargaining still stands strong.129 
D. Franchisors Manipulating the Business-Format Franchise to Avoid Labor 
Violations 
The franchise business-format model promotes rapid expansion of 
companies.130 The difference today is that the franchise model allegedly leaves all 
employment decisions to the franchisees.131 Franchisors claim no legal 
responsibility to collectively bargain with employees of franchisees because they 
have no control over working conditions in the franchises.132 The model only 
allows employees to produce a company’s product and wear the company’s 
symbols.133 Franchisors state that franchisees make the employment decisions for 
their workers, and the franchisee’s control is generally enough to separate 
liability of the franchisor.134 This may be true of the traditional franchise, where 
franchisees are simply provided with a product; but with a business-format 
franchise where the franchisor provides a franchisee with an entire model of how 
to do business, the idea that the franchisor has no control over employment is far-
fetched.135 The General Counsel of the NLRB, Richard Griffin, confirmed this 
finding by stating that the modern franchises exert more control over their 
employees than franchisors exercised in previous decisions.136 The level of 
control franchisors exert over franchisees and their employees is so great that 
franchisors have become an indispensable party to any.137 Griffin also suggests 
that rapid expansion of the modern franchise model may be partially attributed to 
the fact that franchisors embraced the ability to indirectly control employment 
 
127. See Keyserling, supra note 33, at 218 (explaining Wagner’s intent when enacting the NLRA). 
128. See id. (explaining Wagner’s understanding of workers frustration with lack of recognition). 
129. See 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, supra note 40 (stating the intent of the Taft-Hartley 
Act was to stop obstructive labor organization practices). 
130. Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 251. 
131. Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14. 
132. Id. at 14–15. 
133. Fox & Su, supra note 104, at 251. 
134. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15 (stating that the General Counsel does 
not wish to overturn decisions where control of franchisors exercised over franchisees is to ensure brand 
quality). 
135. See id. (recognizing they did not have the intent to overrule franchise decisions in which control was 
to protect brand quality). See Part IV.D.2 for a more in-depth analysis of a joint employer standard being 
applied to a traditional franchise. 
136. Id.  
137. Id.  
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matters without the liability of labor violations.138 These findings solidify the 
conclusion that the enactors of the NLRA would have meant for the Act to 
encompass the modern business-format franchise. 
E. The NLRB’s Decision to Establish McDonald’s as a Joint Employer Reflects 
the Original Intent of the NLRA 
During a keynote speech to law students at West Virginia University, Griffin 
gave insight into the Board’s decision to establish McDonald’s as a joint 
employer.139 He stated that McDonald’s has more everyday involvement with its 
franchisees than most other franchises.140 Software has made it possible to 
monitor various activities in the franchises at any given time.141 Griffin gave an 
example of how McDonald’s monitors the number of customers being served and 
employees working.142 The software contains algorithms that tell the franchisor 
when a particular franchise is not cost efficient and the franchisee has “to start 
sending [employees] home.”143 
If an employee is sent home because the franchisor’s software determined it 
was the most cost-effective way to do business that day, any negotiating the 
employee does with the franchisee will not affect that decision, because it was 
not the franchisees’ decision―it was the franchisor’s.144 Senator Wagner often 
stated that the purpose of the NLRA was “to make the worker a free man.”145 
When a worker is told to go home and is powerless to change the decision, 
Senator Wagner’s goal, and the purpose of the NLRA, is not met.146 Every worker 
deserves the opportunity to engage in collective bargaining and reserve some 
autonomy in the workplace.147 
F. Why Franchises Do Not Want to be Held Jointly Liable for Labor Violations 
Franchises fear the NLRB’s decision finding McDonald’s a joint employer 
with its franchisees, because of the consequences the decision brings to all 
 
138. Id.  
139. Keynote Address at WVU, supra note 108. 
140. Id.  
141. Id.  
142. Id.  
143. Id.  
144. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 14–15 (stating that the franchise model 
exercises control over employees, but does not allow them to collectively bargain with those that are making 
their employment decisions). 
145. Keyserling, supra note 33, at 215. 
146. Id. at 215–16. 
147. See Cox, supra note 39, at 3 (stating that strikes increase when workers are not recognized by 
employers). 
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modern business-format franchises.148 If courts determine that McDonald’s is a 
joint employer, then it will be held jointly liable for any labor violations the 
franchisees commit.149 As a result, franchisors believe they will have to make 
business changes that will ultimately undermine the entire franchise model.150 
However, if the current franchise system developed to allow franchisors to retain 
control over franchisees’ employees without being amenable to suits under the 
NLRA, as suggested above, workers’ rights will better be protected if the 
franchise system operates differently.151 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT EMPLOYER DOCTRINE 
The NLRA includes in its definition of employer, “any person acting as an 
agent of an employer.”152 Whether a franchisee is an agent of the franchisor is a 
complex question that has led courts to develop the joint employer doctrine.153 
The Board would have to establish that the franchisor and franchisee are joint 
employers before a franchisor could be liable to franchise employees for alleged 
labor violations.154 The National Labor Relations Board developed its current 
definition of ‘joint employer’ in both TLI and Laerco:155 
The joint employer concept recognizes that two or more business entities 
are in fact separate but that they share or codetermine those matters 
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment. Whether an 
employer possesses sufficient indicia of control over petitioned-for 
employees employed by another employer is essentially a factual issue. 
To establish joint employer status there must be a showing that the 
employer meaningfully affects matters relating to the employment 
relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and 
direction.156 
 
148. See Trottman & Jargon, supra note 19 (stating that McDonald’s plans to contest the joint employer 
allegations against them as they are improperly placed). 
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2014) (stating the forbidden practices of employers). 
150. Trottman & Jargon, supra note 19. 
151. See Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that there is a possibility the 
franchise model has developed into what it is today to avoid potential labor violations). 
152. 29 U.S.C. § 152. 
153. See id. (not defining joint employer); see also Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 
325 (1984) (referring to joint employer issue and not mentioning the NLRA). 
154. See McGuire, supra note 20, at 238–39 (discussing the jurisdictional element of the NLRB’s power 
to find a franchisor violated an employee of a franchisees rights under the NLRA requires a finding that the 
franchisee and the franchisor are joint employers). 
155. TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798 (1984); Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. at 325. 
156.  Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. at 324. 
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To be considered a joint employer, the narrow standard requires actual, direct 
control by both employers over the employees.157 The General Counsel of the 
NLRB proposed a switch to an older definition of joint employer as an attempt to 
steer away from the new, stricter, standard of joint employer.158 However, both 
definitions require a case-by-case analysis.159 
A. Tracing the Roots of the Doctrine 
The initial uses of the joint employer doctrine helped determine whether 
employees of franchises were able to effectively unionize, either at the term’s 
inception, or under the traditional definition of joint employer. The Board has to 
find a franchisor to be a “‘joint employer’ within the meaning of the National 
Labor Relations Act [for the franchisor] to be liable for a violation of the 
NLRA.”160 The term, however, is not actually used in the NLRA.161 The National 
Labor Relations Board developed its current definition of “joint employer” from 
two cases decided in 1984: TLI and Laerco.162 In those two cases, the definition 
of joint employer was supported by multiple cases.163 Two other decisions, 
Condenser164 and Hod Carriers165 have been cited as support for finding a joint 
employer relationship, but neither actually uses the term.166 Therefore, it is likely 
that these two cases were decided before the term was popularly used to 
determine employer status under the NLRA.167 Condenser and Hod Carriers help 
explain how courts initially examined factual situations that would trigger a joint 
employer analysis in courts today.168 
 
157. See id. at 325 (“There must be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating to 
the employment relationship.”). 
158. Amicus Brief of General Counsel, supra note 5, at 16–17. 
159. See id. at 4 (“determining joint-employer status has always been a factual issue regardless of how the 
Board has defined the standard.”). 
160. N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1982). 
161. 29 U.S.C. § 152. 
162. See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984) (stating the current definition of joint employer); see also 
Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984) (stating the current definition of joint employer). 
163. See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. at 802 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 
1119 (3d Cir. 1982) and Laerco Transp. and Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984)) (using the standards created 
by the cited cases when stating its joint employer definition).  
164. N.L.R.B. v. Condenser Corp. of Am., 128 F.2d 67, 71 (3d. Cir. 1942).  
165. Hod Carriers Local 300 (Austin Co.), 101 N.L.R.B. 197 (1952). 
166. See Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d at 67 (not using the term joint-employer); see also Hod Carriers, 
101 N.L.R.B. 197 (1952) (also not using the term joint-employer). 
167. See Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d at 67. 
168. See infra Part IV.C. 
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B. Analyses of Condenser and Hod Carriers 
In Condenser, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals confronted the problem of 
two separate corporations charged with violations under the NLRA.169 The Board 
sought to enforce an earlier labor violation ruling against Condenser and 
Cornell—Condenser being a “wholly owned subsidiary of Cornell.”170 Cornell 
acquired materials and sold them to Condenser, who in turn produced goods that 
Cornell would purchase and sell on the market.171 Cornell alleged that the 
corporation was not a proper target in the suit because they were “not an 
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Labor Relations Act.”172 The 
court disagreed with this argument.173 The court found that because the company 
constituted one enterprise in the distribution of their products, the relative 
arrangement of the employees between the two corporations was irrelevant.174 
The two corporations simultaneously “[acted] as employers of those employees 
and together actively [dealt] with labor relations of those employees,’” and thus, 
both were liable under the NLRA.175 However, this case was decided before 
courts drew the distinction between a “single employer” and a “joint 
employer.”176 The present day establishment of the “‘single employer’ 
relationship exists where two nominally separate entities are actually part of a 
single integrated enterprise so that, for all purposes, there is in fact only a ‘single 
employer.’”177 If that distinction existed at the time Condenser was decided, it 
would instead fall under a “single employer” rather than a “joint employer” 
analysis.178 
In Hod Carriers, the Board found an independent company liable for 
violations of the NRLA.179 Austin, a construction company, contracted with 
Pinkerton to supply guards for a construction project.180 Employees of Austin, 
who were also members of the Local 300 union, objected to the presence of the 
guards because they were not a part of Local 300.181 In response, Austin cancelled 
 
169. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d at 71. 
170. Id.  
171. Id.  
172. Id.  
173. Id.  
174. Id. 
175. Id. (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 263 (1938)). 
176. See N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that there 
has been “a blurring of concepts” regarding the concepts of ‘single employer’ and ‘joint employer’). 
177. Id.  
178. See id. (using the same language of ‘single integrated enterprise’ to describe ‘single employer’ as 
was used to describe the relationship between Condenser and Cornell); see also Condenser Corp. of Am., 128 
F.2d at 71 (describing the relationship between Condenser and Cornell as one “where in fact the production and 
distribution of merchandise is one enterprise”). 
179. Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1258 (1952). 
180. Id.  
181. Id.  
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the contract with Pinkerton.182 The Pinkerton guards filed suit against Austin for 
violating the NLRA.183 Austin responded that the NLRA only applied to them in 
relation to their own employees.184 However, the Board looked at the construction 
of the NLRA and found to the contrary.185 They held that while particular sections 
of the NLRA did restrict application to employers and their respective 
employees, section 8(a)(3) did not restrict application of the statute to employers 
in this manner; therefore, the NLRA was applicable, even though the guards were 
not employees of Austin.186 
The Board recognized that Austin had to terminate the employment contract 
because the guards assigned were not affiliated with the Local 300 union.187 In 
affirming the Trial Examiner’s holding that Austin was amenable to suit under 
the NLRA, the Board “did not adopt his broad rationale to the effect that conduct 
of any employer which results in coercion of any employee necessarily 
constitutes unfair labor practice.”188 The Board restricted its finding to section 
(a)(3) because the statutory language does not include a restriction specific to 
“[the employer’s] employees.”189 However, other sections, notably section 
(a)(5),190 do limit application to “[the employer’s] employees,” making it unlikely 
that this case’ would apply to those sections of the NLRA.191 
The statutory construction analysis used in Hod Carriers would not turn out 
well for employees of franchisees attempting to unionize for the purpose of 
collective bargaining.192 The Board specifically rejected the use of section (a)(5), 
which forbids employers “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative 
of his employees.”193 The guards were not considered employees, so the Board 
would not honor a case where the Pinkerton guards tried to collectively bargain 
with Austin.194 Presently, franchisors are not considered employers of their 
franchisees’ employees.195 Therefore, under Hod Carrier’s reasoning, it would be 
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191. Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1259 (1952) (noting that the Board was limiting the Trial Examiners 
decision). 
192. See id. (finding Austin guilty of violation of NLRA because section 158 (a)(3) does not restrict 
violations to “[employer’s employees]”). 
193. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (emphasis added); Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. at 1259. 
194. See id. (pointing out that 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) does restrict to “[employer’s employees],” making it 
unlikely that it would extend their holding to a collective bargaining case). 
195. See Daniel Fisher, California Supreme Court Rejects Obama Administration Theory on Franchise 
Employees, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/08/28/ 
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impossible for employees of franchisees to collectively bargain with franchisors 
without a new definition of “joint employer.” 
C. Interim Developments: The Board’s Decision in Browning-Ferris and Why 
This Standard is Favorable, but Will Not Help Employees of Franchisees to 
Unionize 
Under the traditional standard, as set forth by the General Counsel of the 
National Labor Relations Board: 
[A]n entity was a joint employer where it exercised direct or indirect196 
control over significant terms and conditions of employment of another 
entity’s employees; where it possessed the unexercised potential to 
control such terms and conditions of employment; or where ‘industrial 
realities’ otherwise made it an essential party to meaningful collective 
bargaining.197 
The Board, in deciding Browning-Ferris in 2015, called for amici to brief on 
the question of whether the Board should return to the traditional standard, or 
continue to adhere to the standard as laid out in TLI and Laerco.198 In his Amicus 
Brief to the Board, the General Counsel stated his intent to reinstate the 
traditional standard for determining joint employer status.199 The traditional 
standard is relatively broad in comparison to the current standard.200 Congress 
enacted the NLRA with the intent that courts would interpret the term 
“employer” broadly.201 The General Counsel asserted that the best way to achieve 
these goals is to return to the traditional standard.202 
The Brief addressed current problems in meaningful collective bargaining, 
one of which is the franchise model.203 This showed that the General Counsel 
intends to allow collective bargaining between franchisees’ employees and 
franchisors.204 The Board appeared to adopt the General Counsel’s position and 
 
california-supreme-court-rejects-obama-administration-theory-on-franchise-employees/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the California Supreme Court’s recent rejection of the 
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269 N.L.R.B. at 325 (1984) (“There must be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating 
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found that the expansion of workplace arrangements warranted revisiting the 
joint employer standard.205 The Board stated that it may find a joint employer 
relationship exists if “two or more entities are joint employers of a single work 
force if they are both employers within the meaning of the common law,206 and if 
they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and 
conditions of employment.”207 The Board detailed that it “will no longer require 
that a joint employer not only possess the authority to control employees’ terms 
and conditions of employment, but must also exercise that authority, and do so 
directly, immediately, and not in a ‘limited and routine’ manner.”208 The Board 
then expressly stated that it overruled TLI and Laerco, as well as any other Board 
decisions to the extent that they are inconsistent with their current ruling.209 
However, the Board then stated, “[t]he existence, extent, and object of a putative 
joint employer’s control, of course, all may present material issues.”210 The Board 
applied the new standard to the facts presented in the case.211 This suggests that 
the Board will continue to use a case-by-case analysis. 
Although the new broader standard will likely classify the McDonald’s 
franchisor-franchisee relationship as a joint employer relationship, the case-by-
case factual determination will make unionization efforts difficult for franchisee 
employees.212 The problem with using a case-by-case analysis to establish a union 
is that before employees of a franchisee will be able to establish a legal right to 
collectively bargain with a franchisor, they will have to establish that the 
franchise they work for is a joint employer with the franchisor.213 Most franchises 
use standardized contracts, with almost no difference in form from franchise to 
franchise.214 The identical contracts may make it easier to present a case, but there 
are factors besides the contracts that are examined under the analysis as well.215 
When other factors are present, it will be easier for large franchisors to draw out 
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litigation using minor discrepancies between franchises.216 Therefore, any 
definition of joint employer that involves a case-by-case analysis will make 
unionizing unnecessarily difficult for employees of all franchisees.217 
V. THE NEED FOR A FRANCHISE-BY-FRANCHISE DOCTRINE 
Part III of this Comment established that, under the original intent of the 
NLRA, meaningful collective bargaining needs to take place between franchisors 
and employees of franchisees in modern franchises.218 The traditional standard the 
General Counsel presented as the solution to foster collective bargaining is not 
sufficient because it does not allow union formation.219 Unions and labor 
organizations are vital for employees engaging in the collective bargaining 
process.220 The joint employer definition should still be based on the totality of 
the circumstances and indirect effect tests, but instead of requiring a case-by-case 
analysis, the definition should require a franchise-by-franchise analysis. This Part 
will define the franchise-by-franchise doctrine and then apply it to a traditional 
franchise, a business-format franchise, and a distributorship.221 
A. The Franchise-by-Franchise Analysis Doctrine 
The franchise-by-franchise doctrine will encompass the same factors used in 
the Browning-Ferris decision: (1) whether the franchisors are exercising any kind 
of control over the employees of franchisees and (2) whether there is “potential 
to control terms and conditions of employment.”222 Employees will have the 
burden to show that the franchisor exercises enough control such that meaningful 
collective bargaining cannot occur without the involvement of the franchisor.223 If 
the employees are able to prove control is strong enough to establish a joint 
employer relationship, the joint employer relationship will be applied throughout 
the entire franchise. This means that every franchisee in the franchise would be 
considered a joint employer with the franchisor. 
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B. Applying the Franchise-By-Franchise Doctrine 
The franchise-by-franchise doctrine will be applied to three different types of 
franchises: a traditional franchise, a business-format franchise, and a 
distributorship. The doctrine applied to a traditional franchise demonstrates a 
middle-ground where a joint employer designation will depend on the factual 
scenario.224 The doctrine applied to a business-format franchise will generally 
return a joint employer finding.225 The doctrine applied to a distributorship, a 
franchise that typically has no contractual support or training from its 
franchisor,226 generally will not result in a joint employer relationship.227 
1. Application of the Doctrine to a Traditional Franchise 
A car dealership is the quintessential traditional franchise.228 In the traditional 
franchise, “the franchisor is a manufacturer who sells finished or semi-finished 
products to its franchisees . . . [i]n turn, the franchisees resell these products to 
consumers or other firms in the distribution chain.”229 Franchisors retain control 
over various elements of the business, such as requiring a certain number of cars 
to be sold, requiring only parts from the manufacturer to be stocked at the 
dealership, and the overall appearance of the franchised store.230 However, 
because the dealership is receiving a final product, the necessity for franchisors 
to control aspects of the franchisee dealership is minimal.231 Brand quality is 
assured because the franchisor manufactures the product.232 
Applying the first factor of the proposed joint employer test, which questions 
whether the franchisor has exercised any control over the franchisee, 
demonstrates a low level of control. The franchisor does not control the 
employees at the dealership; it merely maintains control over the appearance of 
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the dealership.233 Applying the second factor, regarding the capability of the 
franchisor to exercise control over the employees of the franchisee, weighs 
against a joint employer finding as well. Generally, dealership contracts do not 
contain clauses allowing the franchisor to control any aspect of employment.234 In 
fact, franchisors intentionally keep clauses giving a franchisors’ right to control 
franchisees’ employees out of the contracts because they do not want to be 
responsible for labor violations.235 Although it is unlikely that any franchise 
contract, including business-format contracts, contain such a clause,236 the 
relevant distinction lies in the control necessary to maintain brand quality. In the 
traditional franchise, the need is low because the product has already been 
made.237 
Employees may bring in evidence showing the way the entities have chosen 
to structure their relationship as well.238 If there is sufficient evidence that the 
franchisor controls aspects of franchise employee’s employment, the franchise 
will be deemed a joint employer. Once this declaration is made, the franchisor 
will be a joint employer with all of its franchisees. Therefore, under a broad 
definition of joint employer combined with application of the franchise-by-
franchise doctrine, all employees of a traditional franchise will be able to 
unionize and collectively bargain with the franchisor. 
2. Application of these Factors to the McDonald’s Cases 
The application of the first factor of the test comes out strongly in favor of 
the employees in the McDonald’s cases. The General Counsel unearthed 
evidence that McDonald’s would monitor business in real time and tell 
franchisees immediately how many employees to have on duty when business 
was slow.239 This is a perfect example of a franchisor exercising control over the 
employment of franchisees’ employees. The second factor, as stated above, will 
generally come out in favor of the franchise.240 The franchise will always shy 
away from including any kind of contract clause that grants them control over 
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aspects of franchise employment because they are aware this may expose them to 
liability.241 
However, due to the structure of the arrangement, it is clear that the 
franchisor has the opportunity to exercise control over the franchisees employees. 
McDonald’s, the franchisor, called franchisees and told them to send some of 
their employees home.242 Franchise owners then sent their employees home.243 
These employees cannot meaningfully bargain with franchisee owners to change 
this practice because it is not the franchisee owner making the decision, it is the 
franchisor.244 The only way these employees can change the conditions of their 
employment is to negotiate with the franchisors. Therefore, McDonald’s should 
be designated as a joint employer with all of its franchisees. 
McDonald’s is now clearly established as a joint employer with the 
franchisees that brought these cases under the franchise-by-franchise doctrine. 
The joint employer designation is justified here because McDonald’s 
demonstrated its ability to control aspects of franchise employment decisions. 
This control needs to be balanced with the employees’ ability to collectively 
bargain with the franchisor. Because McDonald’s ability to control has been 
established, the workers’ right to be protected through union representation need 
to be established. Thus, all employees of McDonald’s franchisees will be able to 
collectively bargain with the franchisor. 
3. Application to a Distributorship 
A distributorship is a franchise that generally has no contractual support or 
training from its franchisor.245 Because distributorships do not require a 
storefront, they generally do not need as much guidance as a traditional or 
business-format franchise.246 Distributorship contracts between the franchisor and 
the franchisee only specify amounts of goods to be purchased.247 Because 
franchisors do not exercise control over franchisees in distributorship contracts, 
there is no joint employer relationship. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
There is clearly worker dissatisfaction under the current franchise model; 
there have been multiple strikes in the last few years because of employment 
conditions.248 The strikers are not just demanding higher wages; they are 
demanding the ability to unionize.249 Congress enacted the NLRA to grant these 
rights to employees.250 
The General Counsel’s intent to allow collective bargaining for franchisee 
employees is clear.251 This is further reflected in the Board’s new decision in 
Browning-Ferris, which emphasized that one of the reasons for a broader joint 
employer standard is the ever evolving structure of workplace arrangements.252 
The only problem in its effort to empower workers of franchises is that the new 
definition of joint employer will make it difficult for franchisee employee’s to 
unionize.253 Any definition that continues to use a factual determination of joint 
employer status that will be ineffective in unionization efforts because of the 
difficulty posed by individually labeling each franchise a joint employer with its 
franchise. With the franchise-by-franchise doctrine, the goal of unionization is 
within reach. Once the ability to control is demonstrated over one franchisee, the 
franchisors’ ability to control all of their franchisees is apparent. The franchise-
by-franchise doctrine compensates for this ability to control by empowering 
employees of franchisees to unionize, and thus, to collectively bargain with their 
respective franchisors. 
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